enable = true;
# DOC: https://calomel.org/unbound_dns.html
extraConfig = ''
- port: 53
- verbosity: 1
-
remote-control:
control-enable: yes
control-interface: /run/unbound/unbound.socket
server:
log-queries: no
-
- # The file which contains the listing of primary root DNS servers.
- # To be updated once every six months.
- root-hints: /var/lib/unbound/named.root
-
- # Do no answer id.server and hostname.bind queries.
- hide-identity: yes
- # Do not answer version.server and version.bind queries.
- hide-version: yes
-
- # Will trust glue only if it is within the servers authority.
- # Harden against out of zone rrsets, to avoid spoofing attempts.
- # Hardening queries multiple name servers for the same data to make
- # spoofing significantly harder and does not mandate dnssec.
- harden-glue: yes
-
- # Require DNSSEC data for trust-anchored zones, if such data is absent, the
- # zone becomes bogus. Harden against receiving dnssec-stripped data. If you
- # turn it off, failing to validate dnskey data for a trustanchor will trigger
- # insecure mode for that zone (like without a trustanchor). Default on,
- # which insists on dnssec data for trust-anchored zones.
- harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
-
- # Use 0x20-encoded random bits in the query to foil spoof attempts.
- # http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vixie-dnsext-dns0x20-00
- #
- # When Unbound sends a query to a remote server it sends the hostname
- # string in random upper and lower characters. The remote server must
- # resolve the hostname as if all the characters were lower case. The remote
- # server must then send the query back to Unbound in the same random upper
- # and lower characters that Unbound sent. If the characters of the hostname
- # in the response are in the same format as the query then the dns-0x20
- # check is satisfied.
- # Attackers hoping to poison a Unbound DNS cache must therefore guess the
- # mixed-case encoding of the query and the timing of the return dns answer
- # in addition to all other fields required in a DNS poisoning attack.
- # dns-0x20 increases the difficulty of the attack significantly.
- #
- # It may result in maybe 0.4% of domains getting no answers
- # due to no support on the authoritative server side
- use-caps-for-id: yes
-
- #cache-min-ttl: 3600
- cache-max-ttl: 86400
-
- # Perform prefetching of close to expired message cache entries. If a client
- # requests the dns lookup and the TTL of the cached hostname is going to
- # expire in less than 10% of its TTL, unbound will (1st) return the IP of the
- # host to the client and (2nd) pre-fetch the DNS request from the remote DNS server.
- # This method has been shown to increase the amount of cached hits by
- # local clients by 10% on average.
- prefetch: yes
-
- # Number of threads to create. 1 disables threading.
- # This should equal the number of CPU cores in the machine.
- num-threads: ${toString config.nix.maxJobs}
-
- # The number of slabs to use for cache and must be a power of 2 times the
- # number of num-threads set above. more slabs reduce lock contention,
- # but fragment memory usage.
- msg-cache-slabs: 8
- rrset-cache-slabs: 8
- infra-cache-slabs: 8
- key-cache-slabs: 8
-
- # Increase the memory size of the cache. Use roughly twice as much rrset cache
- # memory as you use msg cache memory. Due to malloc overhead, the total memory
- # usage is likely to rise to double (or 2.5x) the total cache memory.
- rrset-cache-size: 32m
- msg-cache-size: 16m
-
- # buffer size for UDP port 53 incoming (SO_RCVBUF socket option). This sets
- # the kernel buffer larger so that no messages are lost in spikes in the traffic.
- so-rcvbuf: 1m
-
- # Enforce privacy of these addresses. Strips them away from answers.
- # It may cause DNSSEC validation to additionally mark it as bogus.
- # Protects against 'DNS Rebinding' (uses browser as network proxy).
- # Only 'private-domain' and 'local-data' names are allowed
- # to have these private addresses. No default.
- private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
- private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
- private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
-
- # Allow the domain (and its subdomains) to contain private addresses.
- # local-data statements are allowed to contain private addresses too.
- #private-domain: "home.lan"
-
- # If nonzero, unwanted replies are not only reported in statistics, but also
- # a running total is kept per thread. If it reaches the threshold, a warning
- # is printed and a defensive action is taken, the cache is cleared to flush
- # potential poison out of it. A suggested value is 10000000, the default is
- # 0 (turned off). calomel.org thinks 10K is a good value.
- unwanted-reply-threshold: 10000
-
- # IMPORTANT FOR TESTING: If you are testing and setup NSD or BIND on
- # localhost you will want to allow the resolver to send queries to localhost.
- # Make sure to set do-not-query-localhost: yes.
- do-not-query-localhost: yes
-
- # Should additional section of secure message also be kept clean of unsecure
- # data. Useful to shield the users of this validator from potential bogus
- # data in the additional section. All unsigned data in the additional section
- # is removed from secure messages.
- val-clean-additional: yes
+ verbosity: 1
+
+ port: 53
+
+ # The file which contains the listing of primary root DNS servers.
+ # To be updated once every six months.
+ root-hints: /var/lib/unbound/named.root
+
+ # Do no answer id.server and hostname.bind queries.
+ hide-identity: yes
+ # Do not answer version.server and version.bind queries.
+ hide-version: yes
+
+ # Will trust glue only if it is within the servers authority.
+ # Harden against out of zone rrsets, to avoid spoofing attempts.
+ # Hardening queries multiple name servers for the same data to make
+ # spoofing significantly harder and does not mandate dnssec.
+ harden-glue: yes
+
+ # Require DNSSEC data for trust-anchored zones, if such data is absent, the
+ # zone becomes bogus. Harden against receiving dnssec-stripped data. If you
+ # turn it off, failing to validate dnskey data for a trustanchor will trigger
+ # insecure mode for that zone (like without a trustanchor). Default on,
+ # which insists on dnssec data for trust-anchored zones.
+ harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
+
+ # Use 0x20-encoded random bits in the query to foil spoof attempts.
+ # http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vixie-dnsext-dns0x20-00
+ #
+ # When Unbound sends a query to a remote server it sends the hostname
+ # string in random upper and lower characters. The remote server must
+ # resolve the hostname as if all the characters were lower case. The remote
+ # server must then send the query back to Unbound in the same random upper
+ # and lower characters that Unbound sent. If the characters of the hostname
+ # in the response are in the same format as the query then the dns-0x20
+ # check is satisfied.
+ # Attackers hoping to poison a Unbound DNS cache must therefore guess the
+ # mixed-case encoding of the query and the timing of the return dns answer
+ # in addition to all other fields required in a DNS poisoning attack.
+ # dns-0x20 increases the difficulty of the attack significantly.
+ #
+ # It may result in maybe 0.4% of domains getting no answers
+ # due to no support on the authoritative server side
+ use-caps-for-id: yes
+
+ #cache-min-ttl: 3600
+ cache-max-ttl: 86400
+
+ # Perform prefetching of close to expired message cache entries. If a client
+ # requests the dns lookup and the TTL of the cached hostname is going to
+ # expire in less than 10% of its TTL, unbound will (1st) return the IP of the
+ # host to the client and (2nd) pre-fetch the DNS request from the remote DNS server.
+ # This method has been shown to increase the amount of cached hits by
+ # local clients by 10% on average.
+ prefetch: yes
+
+ # Number of threads to create. 1 disables threading.
+ # This should equal the number of CPU cores in the machine.
+ num-threads: ${toString config.nix.maxJobs}
+
+ # The number of slabs to use for cache and must be a power of 2 times the
+ # number of num-threads set above. more slabs reduce lock contention,
+ # but fragment memory usage.
+ msg-cache-slabs: 8
+ rrset-cache-slabs: 8
+ infra-cache-slabs: 8
+ key-cache-slabs: 8
+
+ # Increase the memory size of the cache. Use roughly twice as much rrset cache
+ # memory as you use msg cache memory. Due to malloc overhead, the total memory
+ # usage is likely to rise to double (or 2.5x) the total cache memory.
+ rrset-cache-size: 32m
+ msg-cache-size: 16m
+
+ # buffer size for UDP port 53 incoming (SO_RCVBUF socket option). This sets
+ # the kernel buffer larger so that no messages are lost in spikes in the traffic.
+ so-rcvbuf: 1m
+
+ # Enforce privacy of these addresses. Strips them away from answers.
+ # It may cause DNSSEC validation to additionally mark it as bogus.
+ # Protects against 'DNS Rebinding' (uses browser as network proxy).
+ # Only 'private-domain' and 'local-data' names are allowed
+ # to have these private addresses. No default.
+ private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
+ private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
+ private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
+
+ # Allow the domain (and its subdomains) to contain private addresses.
+ # local-data statements are allowed to contain private addresses too.
+ #private-domain: "home.lan"
+
+ # If nonzero, unwanted replies are not only reported in statistics, but also
+ # a running total is kept per thread. If it reaches the threshold, a warning
+ # is printed and a defensive action is taken, the cache is cleared to flush
+ # potential poison out of it. A suggested value is 10000000, the default is
+ # 0 (turned off). calomel.org thinks 10K is a good value.
+ unwanted-reply-threshold: 10000
+
+ # IMPORTANT FOR TESTING: If you are testing and setup NSD or BIND on
+ # localhost you will want to allow the resolver to send queries to localhost.
+ # Make sure to set do-not-query-localhost: yes.
+ do-not-query-localhost: yes
+
+ # Should additional section of secure message also be kept clean of unsecure
+ # data. Useful to shield the users of this validator from potential bogus
+ # data in the additional section. All unsigned data in the additional section
+ # is removed from secure messages.
+ val-clean-additional: yes
'';
};
systemd.services.unbound = {
serviceConfig = {
RuntimeDirectory = "unbound";
RuntimeDirectoryMode = "0700";
- ExecPostStop = lib.mkForce ''
- "${pkgs.utillinux}/bin/umount ${stateDir}/dev/random"
- "${pkgs.utillinux}/bin/umount ${stateDir}/run/unbound"
- '';
+ # FIXME: upstream service shouldn't overwrite ExecStopPost
+ # so that postStop can be used.
+ ExecStopPost = lib.mkForce (pkgs.writeShellScript "unit-script-unbound-post-stop" ''
+ ${pkgs.utillinux}/bin/umount ${stateDir}/dev/random
+ ${pkgs.utillinux}/bin/umount ${stateDir}/run/unbound
+ '');
};
preStart = ''
install -m 444 -o unbound -g nogroup \