README.md

   1 # Majority Judgment
   2
   3 ## Common language
   4
   5 The Majority Judgment asks us to judge each choice in an absolute way
   6 (i.e. such that the removal or addition of choices
   7 does not change our evaluation of the other choices)
   8 by giving them a grade (or level) on a common scale.
   9
  10 This common scale contains as many grades as our supposed common expertise
  11 is able to distinguish, in order to faithfully represent
  12 the properties of the attribute it tries to measure.
  13 Hence, a common scale should be crafted for each different attribute.
  14 The inter-subjective meaning of each grade
  15 being reinforced by the practice of judgments.
  16
  17 ### Examples
  18
  19 Examples of common scales could be:
  20 - [“No”, “No, but”, “Yes, but”, “Yes”] for adhesion,
  21 - [“None”, “Not Enough”, “Enough”, “Much”, “Too Much”] for quantity,
  22 - [“To Do”, “Prioritized”, “Blocking”, “Urgent”, “Too Urgent”] for priority,
  23 - [“Useless”, “Interesting”, “Useful”, “Indispensable”, “Enslaving”] for utility,
  24 - [“To Reject”, “Insufficient”, “Acceptable”, “Good”, “Very Good”, “Too Good”] for quality.
  25
  26 ## Judging one choice
  27
  28 For each choice taken separately,
  29 the initial common scale (whose grades are all of equal length 1)
  30 is dilated such that the length of each grade is multiplied
  31 by the number of individual judgments of this grade obtained by this choice.
  32 Like this, the only level which is defended by an absolute majority
  33 begining from one side of the scale,
  34 without being rejected by an absolute majority
  35 beginning from the other side of the scale,
  36 is the one which spans over the middle of this dilated scale.
  37 This is the most consensual majority grade for this choice.
  38
  39 If the number of individual judgments is small and even,
  40 there is however a probability that two different grades
  41 border the middle of this dilated scale,
  42 but only the lower grade rewards consensus,
  43 and thus is considered to be the most consensual.
  44 Indeed, if any other choice obtains less scattered judgments
  45 all enclosed to this two grades,
  46 it will obtain a most consensual majoritary grade
  47 greater or egal to the one of this choice.
  48 Which would not necessarily be the case with the greater grade.
  49
  50 ## Ranking many choices
  51
  52 To sort many choices means being able to compare them two-by-two,
  53 which is done according to their most consensual majority grade.
  54 In case of equality, the minimum individual judgments of this grade
  55 are removed from both dilated scales so that one of them has no longer any,
  56 then the comparison goes on with the new most consensual majority grades.
  57 Like this, either a choice is judged higher than the other,
  58 by the geatest number of judgments which differenciate them according
  59 to a most consensual majoritary grade,
  60 or both choices precisely have the same distribution of individual judgments.
  61
  62 One can see that the farest an individual judgment is
  63 from the most consensual majoritary grade,
  64 the less impact it has on the result.
  65 This rewards honest individual judgments,
  66 by ignoring as near as may be the most cranky or strategic judgements.
  67
  68 ## Properties
  69
  70 The Majority Judgment is:
  71
  72 - allowing anonymity:
  73   interchanging the names of judges does not change the outcome:
  74   all judges are given an equal power.
  75
  76 - neutral:
  77   interchanging the names of choices does not change the outcome:
  78   all choices are treated equally.
  79
  80 - complete:
  81   every choice is either superior or inferior
  82   to any other choice, or both when equal.
  83   Hence the Majority Judgement is not subject
  84   to Condorcet's paradox.
  85
  86 - monotone:
  87   if a choice is superior or egal to another one,
  88   and a judge increases its grade for it,
  89   it becomes strictly superior.
  90
  91 - transitive:
  92   if a first choice is superior to a second one,
  93   and this second one is superior to a third,
  94   then the first is superior to the third).
  95
  96 - coherent:
  97   it is independent of irrelevant alternatives as formulated by Nash-Chernoff:
  98   removal or addition of choices does not change
  99   the judges’ evaluations of the other choices.
 100   Hence the Majority Judgement is not subject
 101   to Arrow's paradox.
 102
 103 - strategy-proof-in-grading:
 104   judging a choice higher or lower
 105   than our intimate judgement has the opposite impact
 106   on its most consensual majority grade.
 107
 108 - partially strategy-proof-in-ranking:
 109   increasing (resp. decreasing) the rank of a choice with respect to another choice,
 110   can not decrease (resp. increase) the rank of this other choice.
 111
 112 - not Condorcet-consistent except when the electorate is “polarized”
 113   (when the higher (resp. the lower) a judge evaluates one choice the lower (resp. the higher)
 114   she/he evaluates the other, so there can be no consensus)
 115   hence when judges are most tempted to manipulate.
 116
 117 - not excluding the no-show paradox (when it is better for a judge not to judge
 118   than to express her/his opinion sincerely because her/his vote
 119   can tip the scales against his favorite choice).
 120
 121   This property is judged insignificant, by Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki,
 122   when compared with the serious problems of methods of election,
 123   the Arrow and Condorcet paradoxes and strategic manipulation.