1 { inputs, pkgs, lib, config, ... }:
3 #boot.kernelPackages = lib.mkDefault pkgs.linuxPackages_hardened;
4 boot.kernelPackages = lib.mkDefault pkgs.linuxPackages_latest;
5 #environment.memoryAllocator.provider = "libc";
6 nix.allowedUsers = [ "@users" ];
7 networking.firewall.pingLimit = "--limit 60/minute --limit-burst 5";
8 security.allowSimultaneousMultithreading = false;
9 security.apparmor.enable = lib.mkDefault true;
10 security.forcePageTableIsolation = true;
11 security.lockKernelModules = lib.mkDefault true;
12 security.protectKernelImage = true;
13 security.virtualisation.flushL1DataCache = "always";
14 services.openssh.passwordAuthentication = false;
15 boot.blacklistedKernelModules = [
16 # Obscure network protocols
21 # Old or rare or insufficiently audited filesystems
44 boot.kernel.sysctl = {
45 # Mitigate kernel pointer leaks
46 "kernel.kptr_restrict" = 2;
47 # Restricts the kernel log to the CAP_SYSLOG capability
48 "kernel.dmesg_restrict" = 1;
49 # Prevent information leaks
50 #kernel.printk = "3 3 3 3";
51 # Restrict eBPF to the CAP_BPF capability
52 # and enable JIT hardening techniques
53 # such as constant blinding.
54 "kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled" = 1;
55 "net.core.bpf_jit_harden" = 2;
56 # Restricts loading TTY line disciplines
57 # to the CAP_SYS_MODULE capability to prevent
58 # unprivileged attackers from loading vulnerable
59 # line disciplines with the TIOCSETD ioctl
60 "dev.tty.ldisc_autoload" = 0;
61 # The userfaultfd() syscall is often abused to exploit
62 # use-after-free flaws.
63 # Due to this, this sysctl is used to restrict
64 # this syscall to the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability.
65 "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" = 0;
66 # kexec is a system call that is used
67 # to boot another kernel during runtime.
68 "kernel.kexec_load_disabled" = 1;
69 # User namespaces are a feature in the kernel which aim to
70 # improve sandboxing and make it easily accessible for
71 # unprivileged users however, this feature exposes
72 # significant kernel attack surface for privilege
73 # escalation so this sysctl restricts the usage of user
74 # namespaces to the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability.
75 "kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone" = 0;
76 # Restricts all usage of performance events to the
77 # CAP_PERFMON capability
78 "kernel.perf_event_paranoid" = 3;
79 # Helps protect against SYN flood attacks
80 "net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies" = 1;
81 # Protects against time-wait assassination
82 # by dropping RST packets for sockets
83 # in the time-wait state.
84 "net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337" = 1;
85 # Disable ICMP redirect acceptance and sending to prevent
86 # man-in-the-middle attacks and minimize information disclosure.
87 "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
88 "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
89 "net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects" = 0;
90 "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects" = 0;
91 "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
92 "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
93 "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects" = 0;
94 "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects" = 0;
95 # Disable source routing, a mechanism
96 # that allows users to redirect network traffic.
97 "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
98 "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route" = 0;
99 "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
100 "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route" = 0;
102 # Disable TCP SACK, which is commonly exploited
103 # and unnecessary for many circumstances.
104 # https://serverfault.com/questions/10955/when-to-turn-tcp-sack-off
105 "net.ipv4.tcp_sack" = 0;
106 "net.ipv4.tcp_dsack" = 0;
107 "net.ipv4.tcp_fack" = 0;
109 # Generate a random IPv6 address
110 "net.ipv6.conf.all.use_tempaddr" = 2;
111 "net.ipv6.conf.default.use_tempaddr" = 2;
112 # Restricts usage of ptrace to only processes
113 # with the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability
114 "kernel.yama.ptrace_scope" = 2;
115 # Do source validation by confirming reverse path
116 "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter" = 1;
117 "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter" = 1;
119 boot.kernelParams = [
124 "page_alloc.shuffle=1"
129 # Disabled because zfs and wireguard modules are not signed
130 "module.sig_enforce=0"
131 "lockdown=confidentiality"